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INTRODUCTION
Many  poor  aid-recipient  countries  view  foreign  aid  as  a  critical  ingredient  in  their
development strategy, even though its development effectiveness remains in question among many
economists. At the same time, the level and trends of foreign aid are increasingly  becoming sensitive
issues in donor countries' budgetary discussions, with analysts observing increasing signs of  "donor
fatigue".  In particular, International Financial Institutions have expressed concerns regarding the
level of overall development aid and the possible crowding out  of poor  traditional recipients by
former socialist economies.  Whatever the merits of these views, the key issue arises of whether the
aid aggregates commonly used by policymakers and researchers in their assessments of development
aid provide  an  accurate  measure  of  true  aid flows.  In  this  paper  we  analyze the  traditional
methodology underlying these conventional measures and propose a new approach.
Official financial flows are traditionally classified as concessional on the basis of the OECD's
Official Development Assistance (ODA) classification, and aid flows are traditionally measured by
the corresponding Net ODA statistic. For example, the World Bank's Global Development Finance
uses Net ODA information to analyze trends in aid flows over time as well as across recipients and
donors.  Despite its popularity, however, the methodology underlying Net ODA aggregates suffers
from a number of shortcomings.  Consequently, the analysis of aid flows needs to be revisited in the
light of more satisfactory measures based on improved methodologies. In this paper we analyze the
nature  of the  proposed  improvements and illustrate them with  a comparative  assessment of the
overall trends in aid flows to 133 developing economies.'
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 summarizes the shortcomings
of conventional measures of aid, and Section 2 proposes a new approach to overcome them.  The
implementation of this new approach leads to  an alternative aid measure which we label Effective
Development Assistance (EDA), which is developed in Section 3.  Section 4 illustrates the proposed
method by re-assessing trends  in aid flows on the basis of EDA, and comparing them with those
implied by Net ODA. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
1. WHIAT  IS WRONG WITH CONVENTIONAL FOREIGN AID MEASURES?
Foreign  aid is  conventionally measured  on  the  basis  of  the  OECD's  ODA,  a  concept
introduced in the early 1  970s.  ODA comprises official  financial flows with a development purpose in
the form of grants  (inclusive of those tied to  technical assistance) and highly concessional loans.
Loans  are defined as highly concessional when their grant element -- i.e., the  subsidy implicitly
included in the loan, relative to  the loans'  face value -- is at least 25 percent,  as measured by a
formula to be analyzed in depth in the next section.  The leading measure of foreign aid flows is the
so-called Net ODA, which is the net disbursement amount, i.e., disbursements minus amortization, of
those flows classified as ODA.
The resulting improved  aid data, disaggregated by recipient country and  donor type,  is available on  the
internet at http://www.worldbank.org/htmn/prdmg/grthweb/ddaid.htm.3
Is Net  ODA  an  appropriate measure  of  aid flows  ?  Conceptually, international  finance
flowing to capital-scarce developing countries may involve efficiency gains even if the flows accrue
on market terms - as long as the funds are used appropriately. Such efficiency  gains translate into net
financial gains for the recipient countries.  The main purpose of measuring foreign aid flows is to
assess the portion of those gains that is due to a pure transfer of resources from donors to recipients
through below-market, subsidized financial terms  -- i.e., to  assess the  donors'  net  financial cost,
rather than the (presumably larger) recipients' benefit.
Net  ODA, however, does not accurately measure the cost that  donors incur in connection
with their aid (especially debt) flows, and as a result the evolution of Net ODA over time, as well as
across donors and recipients, likely provides a distorted picture of aid trends. This distortion is due
to seven conceptual shortcomings of Net ODA that we detail below.
Shortcomings of Net ODA: Gross and Net Flows
1. Under-estimation of the aid content due to netting out.  The financial cost involved in donors' aid
provided in a given year is a forward-looking concept reflected in the fractional value of the debt
service claims acquired in exchange for up-front (gross) disbursements in that period, irrespective of
the amortization of previously contracted debt obligations.  Therefore, on this account, the net flow
nature  of Net  ODA,  i.e.,  disbursements rninus amortization, underestimates  the  aid content  of
disbursed flows by netting out  amortization payments.  For example, a constant flow of ilentical
highly concessional loans over time entails a continuous cost on the part of the donor but  yields  a
zero Net ODA flow, since amortization payments exactly offset disbursements.  In such case, Net
ODA would completely fail to capture the aid content of flows.
Aside from this netting out involved in Net ODA, the rest of the shortcomings relate to the
flow amounts classified as ODA:
Shortcomings of ODA: Aggregation and Coverage
Design  shortcomnings  of  ODA  related  to  loan  coverage  and  aggregation  obscure  the
interpretation of this measure.  The three main conceptual problems are:
2. Over-representation of loans with high concessionality. ODA includes the full face value of both
grants and highly concessional loans without distinguishing between the two. However, concessional
loans entail repayment obligations, and, therefore, the aid they involve, i.e. the net financial cost to
donors, is only a fraction of their face value.  The inclusion in ODA of the full face value of these
loans overestimates their aid content.  Only grants, that is to say pure unrequited transfers, should be
accounted at full value. 2
3.  Under-representation  of  loans  with  low  concessionality.  Under  the  ODA  definition,  non-
concessional loans include loans on market terms as well as concessional loans with low degree of
concessionality.  The aid content of the latter - i.e., the donors'  cost involved in these loans -- is
therefore not captured by ODA.
2Assuming that the grant is not tied or subject  to other  financial  quid  pro quo.4
4. Coverage.  The inclusion in ODA of official technical assistance grants by their full value can be
seen as another shortcoming.  In this case, the donor benefits from payments received in return for
the technical assistance supplied, and this may greatly reduce the donor's net financial cost. 3
Shortcomings  of ODA: The Grant Element
As  noted  above, ODA  is  based  on  a  sharp  distinction between  concessional  and  non-
concessional loans, drawing from their respective grant elements. Conceptually, the calculation of the
grant element, i.e., the degree of concessionality, involves the computation of the expected present
value of the stream of debt service obligations associated with the loan under consideration.  To the
extent that the discount rate utilized reflects the creditor's  opportunity cost, i.e., the return it could
make on alternative investments of the same capital, this present value measures the economic value
of debt service repayments and, on this account, the financial value of the loan.  The grant element of
the loan is the portion of the loan that, at a given time, is not expected to be repaid, i.e. the shortfall
of the above-mentioned present value relative to the amount disbursed.
For the purposes of ODA, loans are classified as concessional if their grant element exceeds
25  percent,  and  as non-concessional  (and  hence  ignored)  otherwise.  The  grant  elements are
computed using some special assumptions, however: most importantly, loan interest rates (used to
compute interest charges) are assumed to remain constant throughout the life of the loan, and a fixed
10 percent discount rate is utilized in all present value calculations. This methodology for computing
grant  elements contains a number of shortcomings, which may lead to  loan misclassification and
distortion of ODA figures across time, donors, and recipients:
5. Discount Rates.  In order to reflect donors'  opportunity costs, the discount rates used for present
value calculations should correspond to applicable market rates.  The fixed 10 percent discount rate
utilized in ODA fails that test on at least three important dimensions to which it should be sensitive,
namely time, currency, and maturity:
a) Time.  Discount rates should evolve over time with market conditions prevailing at the time the
aid content of loans is estimated.  For example, to measure the donors'  cost as seen at the time of
loan disbursement, the market terms prevailing at that time should be used.
b)  Currency.  At  any point  in time,  market rates,  and therefore  appropriate  discount rates,  are
currency specific. The discount rate should follow the currency in which debt service is payable.
c) Maturity.  At any point in time and for any given currency, market rates depend on the length of
the repayment period according to the so-called yield curve.  Therefore, the discount rates applied to
the  debt service stream should vary over  the life of the loan according to  the timing of  service
payments.
3The exclusion of  private source financing from ODA coverage appears justified,  however, because
commercial  lending  contains  no aid by definition.5
6. Variable Rate Loans.  In the case of variable rate loans, the construction of the future debt service
stream requires a forecast of interest rate  charges.  This is especially important for floating rates
linked to future market conditions (e.g., indexed to  six-month LIBOR).  ODA makes no attempt to
predict these conditions and implicitly  assumes that, like in the case of fixed-rate loans, variable rates
will remain constant at their level at the time of disbursement.
7. Credit Risk.  In the absence of credit risk, the 'market rates' mentioned above are risk-free:  rates.
However,  credit risk is implicitly an additional source  of donor financial cost  from an  economic
viewpoint -- as opposed to a contractual, legal perspective.  As such, it should be incorporated.  in the
calculation of the  grant  element,  either  through  augmenting the  discount  rate  or  through  the
utilization of lower expected debt service projections, or both. This is admittedly a difficult taslk,  as it
would require the use  of borrower-specific risk spreads and/or default probabilities. In any case,
ODA makes no attempt to adjust for credit risk.
2.  A NEW APPROACH: EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
On the whole, the methodological shortcomings of Net ODA just summarized underscore the
need for an alternative approach to the measurement of aid flows. Our proposed approach is based
on the grant equivalent of financial flows.  We first elaborate on grant equivalents and then explain
the  methodology  for  computing  the  adjusted  foreign  aid  measure,  which  we  call  Effective
Development Assistance, or EDA. This section provides  a brief overview of the key  issues; the
analytical details are described at length in the next section.
Measuring the Aid Content of Financial Inflows: Grant Equivalent and Grant Element
The grant equivalent of a financial inflow is the amount that, at the time of its commitnment,  is
not expected to  be repaid, i.e., the amount subsidized through below-market terms at the time of
commitment. By definition, the grant equivalent of a pure grant is the amount of the grant itself  In
contrast, the grant equivalent of a concessional loan is only part of the loan amount, and becomes
negligible as loan terms approach market terms.  In other words, the grant equivalent, G, measures
the shortfall between the loan amount disbursed, D, and the present value of the associated expected
debt  service  obligations,  E.4 Correspondingly,  a  loan  can  be  interpreted  as  including  two
components: a loan component, equal to the debt equivalent E, and a grant component, equal to the
grant equivalent G, so that  a concessional loan disbursed by an amount D is equivalent to  a non-
concessional loan by an amount E and a pure grant by an amount G:
G=D-E  (2.1)
By definition, the grant element, g, measures the grant  equivalent as a proportion  of the
inflow disbursed. Therefore, in terms of the more familiar  grant element:
4Conceptually,  this present value E was first made operational  and utilized to reduce bond exchanges  under
the Brady debt reduction program to comparable debt equivalent terms  (see Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias,
1992), and was later utilized to measure  the debt equivalent  of concessional  debt stocks  for the purpose  of measuring
country  indebtedness  (e.g., in the Heavily  Indebted  Poor Countries  (HIPC)  initiative).6
G  (2.2)
gD
In the extreme case of a pure grant, no service payments are called for (E=O), the  grant
equivalent is the grant itself (G=D) and the grant element (expressed as a  percentage) is g=100
percent.  At the other extreme, in financially "fair" lending, debt service equals disbursements in
present value (E=D) and the grant equivalent and grant element are zero.  This is the case expected
of competitive commercial  lending and, at least approximately, is also the case of market-based, non-
concessional official lending. 5 However, official creditors providing "soft" loans, i.e., concessional
lending, extend loans with  relatively low debt service (E<D), whose  grant  equivalent and  grant
element are consequently positive. 6
We define EDA as the sum of the grant equivalents of all development flows disbursed in a
given period, thus eliminating the distortion introduced by the deduction of amortization payments in
Net  ODA noted in  shortcoming (1) above.  This  simple method  of  converting all inflows to  a
common denominator also eliminates the over- and under-estimation of the aid content of loans as
measured by ODA, allowing for a correct aggregation of the aid included in grants and loans in terms
of comparable units. It therefore solves the ODA shortcomings (2) and (3) above.
In order  to  address the coverage  shortcoming (4), and following traditional World Bank
methodology,  grants  tied  to  technical  assistance are  excluded  from  EDA.7 This  is just  a  first
approximation to the ideal procedure by which the grant equivalent of tied grants would be adjusted
by deducting the benefit that the donor enjoys from the quidpro  quo.
The grant content of a loan whose service due extends over T periods (e.g., years) can also
be analyzed by focussing on each period t (ranging from 1 to T) in the life of the loan and comparing
the contractually-determined interest rate it applicable to the period in question with the discount rate
dt employed to bring to present-value terms the service payments due in that period. If the interest
rate coincides with the discount rate (it=d,) in every period, the grant element and grant equivalent
are null irrespective of the debt service time profile (e.g., the grace and maturity of the loan).  If the
interest rate is consistently below the discount rate (i,<dt),  the grant element and grant equivalent are
both positive.  The larger the gap between the interest and discount rates, the larger the absolute
value of the grant element.  For any given gap between the two rates, the grant element becomes
larger as debt service payments are stretched over a longer time period by backloading amortization
payments (e.g. longer grace period and maturity), reaching its maximum in the case of a consol, i.e.,
a loan with an infinite grace period (see the details in Appendix B).
'  In practice,  lags between  commitment  and disbursement  times  may  result  in small  deviations  from this
benchmark.  Likewise,  price-smoothing  practices  of  Multilateral  Development  Banks  may  lead  to cyclical  variation  in
grant  elements:  with  loan  interest  rates  determined  as a moving-average  of current  and past  market  interest  rates,  loan
rates  tend  to lag behind  market  rates,  so that grant elements  temporarily  rise when  market  rates  are rising  and fall
when  market  rates  are  falling.
6  The  expressions  in the text implicitly  assume  that loans are disbursed  in a single  installment,  and need
modification  if this  is not  the case.  The  general  formulas  are  presented  in the  next  section.
7 However,  in the data  files  made  available  with  this paper,  technical  assistance  is attached  as a memo  item
for interested  users.7
One implication of the above discussion is that as long as the appropriate discount rate is
below 10 percent, the grant element calculations underlying ODA - which make use of the arlbitrary
10 percent discount rate - will lead to a systematic over-estimation of the grant element and. grant
equivalent of loans.  Further,  such overestimation is larger the longer the  duration of the  loan.
Therefore,  non-concessional loans would  be  incorrectly shown  as  concessional,  and  marginally
concessional loans would be shown as highly concessional, especially if they are long-term. 8
To  avoid this  distortion,  our  proposed  method  to  compute  grant  elements  and  grant
equivalents is based  on  market  discount rates  sensitive to  currency, timing,  and  maturity, thus
addressing shortcoming (5) of ODA as described in the previous section.  In essence, this is achieved
by extracting the discount rates from the yield curve for risk-free instruments prevailing at the time of
disbursement. We do this separately for each currency under consideration. These time-, curTency-
and maturity-specific discount rates are used to bring future debt service to present-value terms or, in
other words, to compute the debt equivalent  E.
As part of this calculation, our proposed method involves the construction of the debt service
payment stream, which is accomplished taking into account the amortization schedule and interest
terms of each loan. In the  (relatively frequent) case of variable-rate debt, this in turn  requires a
forecast of the interest rates applicable in future years, in order to address shortcoming (6) of ODA.
As explained in detail below, we obtain such forecast making use of the yield curve of the relevant
currency.
Donors' Effort and Expected Aid
It should be noticed that the donors' "effort", that our improved aid measure tries to capture,
refers to  donors'  voluntary net financial costs, as opposed to  the financial costs realized ex-post,
which are partly determined by the realization of market rates over time. For that reason, d.onors'
expectations should refer to the conditions at the time at which financial commitments were  made.
Consequently, in  this  proposed  approach  expected  interest  rates  are  derived  from  the  imarket
conditions prevailing at the time  of commitment, rather than those  prevailing at a  later  date  or
realized ex-post.
Credit risk, i.e., the risk of default, is also a factor to consider in the measurement of dionors'
expected financial losses and, consequently, grant elements.  Traditional ODA measures ignore this
factor, as it was pointed out in shortcoming (7).  While we recognize that credit risk is a factor to be
taken into account in the new approach being proposed, either by a downward adjustment of the
expected debt service stream or by augmenting the discount rate to reflect a risky opportunity cost,
we have chosen not to make adjustments on this account in our EDA calculations.  Correspondingly,
our EDA  statistics are subject to  the  caveat that they reflect contractual  aid, as opposed to  aid
inclusive of the anticipation of failures to comply with contractual payments.
8 This explains the sometimes large ODA-based  grant element of commitments  of private creditors to
developing  countries,  as reported  in the World  Bank's  Global  Development  Finance.8
The case has been made that multilateral lending, and perhaps official lending in general,
carries a negligible risk of default.  If official lenders perceive that to be the case, then the previous
caveat is not relevant.  This case is supported by the fact that open defaults on official lending are
rare.  However,  debt reductions  and  condonations  of various  kinds are  common, especially of
bilateral debts.  The view that default risk is negligible is consistent with the interpretation that this
kind of debt relief is additional voluntary aid.9 Nevertheless, an alternative interpretation is that this
debt relief is the manifestation of contract breaching on the part of the debtor.  Furthermore, some
analysts view credit risk on official lending higher than it appears by virtue of being hidden by new
lending at higher concessional terms to sustain full service of all debts.  In the absence of an accepted
methodology, we chose to neglect credit risk in the proposed approach at this time.  10
3.  EMPIRICAL  IMPLEMENTATION
We next summarize the procedure followed to  construct our proposed measure of Effective
Development Assistance (EDA) defined above. We proceed in two stages: first we describe the data
used,  and  then  we  spell out  in  more  detail the  application of  the  methodological framework
introduced in the previous section.
3.1  Data
Construction  of  effective development assistance along the  lines described in  section  2
requires two basic pieces of information: first, detailed data on the volume and features of official
financial flows --  specifically, the  characteristics of  the  disbursement and  repayment schedules,
interest charges and other fees of official loans -- and, second, a suitable set of discount rates that
properly reflect opportunity costs.
Financial flow  data
As noted earlier, official  financial flows consist of loans and grants, with the latter sometimes
defined to include technical assistance (TA).  Figure 3.1 .presents the historical distribution of official
flows among these three categories.  As discussed in the previous section, the inclusion of technical
assistance in aid aggregates is highly questionable, due to its quid pro  quo nature.  For this reason,
we restrict the focus to official flows exclusive of TA.
Since we have defined EDA as the sum of official grants plus the grant equivalent of official
development-oriented loans, measuring EDA involves the computation of the grant equivalents of
official loans. This is inherently a loan-by-loan task requiring information on grace, maturity, interest,
9  Because  we adopt an ex-ante perspective,  our EDA  calculations  do not consider  debt relief,  be it in the form
of debt forgiveness  or debt rescheduling,  as new aid. Debt relief, or the accumulation  of arrears for that matter,
essentially amounts to an ex-post modification of the debt service  schedule  that involves  involuntary  aid, thus outside
the scope  of  EDA.  Notice  that conventional  Net ODA  accounts  for debt  relief  by recording  a fictitious  disbursement
matched  with an equally  fictitious  loan repayment,  with no effect  on Net ODA  totals.
'1 The assessment  of the credit risk of official debt is mnired  with a number of  technical difficulties  (see
Demirguc-Kunt  and Fernandez-Arias 1992 for details). It is clear that such assessment  requires an analysis of the
conditions  of each recipient  country  over  time. Perhaps less  obvious,  credit risk assessments  should  also discriminate
among  official  creditors.9
disbursement profiles, repayment schedules, and  any other contractual  provision, relevant  to the
expected cash flow streams associated with each official  loan included in the analysis.
Such highly-detailed information was obtained from the World Bank's  Debtor  Reporting
System (DRS) -- the main database underlying the World Bank's Global Development Finance. The
DRS,  established in  1952, is debtor-based -- i.e., the data is compiled from reports  provicled by
borrowing countries. Its coverage  is quite broad: it includes all bilateral, multilateral and private
creditors,'" and all aid-receiving members of the World Bank. 12
The DRS is very similar to the OECD's  Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which provides
the basis for the OECD's Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients. There are
some differences, however, between the two systems. The CRS encompasses some 180 recipients,
including a considerable number of dependent territories and colonies that  are excluded from the
DRS.  Apart  from these  sub-sovereign entities, the recipient coverage of both  systems is nearly
identical, with the main difference  being the exclusion from the DRS system of a handful of countries
that have graduated from the World Bank's lending programs.' 3 Also, in contrast with the dlebtor-
based DRS, the CRS collects information directly from the creditors that it covers -- members of the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and multilateral lending agencies. As described in
more detail below, this may lead to some discrepancies between the two sources.
In practice, our choice of the DRS as the basic source of loan data imposes some limritations
on the time dimension of the analysis. Although the DRS contains information on loans contracted as
far back as the mid 50s, loan coverage is somewhat limited prior to  1970 - the year when the system
underwent a major upgrade  and  expansion. Thus, we  confine our  sample to  all official loans'4
contracted in or  after  1970 -- which amount to  some 40,000 loans.'5 Because of  disbursement
delays, these loans account for the bulk of official  loan disbursements only starting in 1975; hence the
aggregates reported below span the period 1975-95.
Lastly, we also  exclude from our  coverage the  1995 Tequila loans to  both  Mexico  and
Argentina.  These special loans carried hard terms that would translate into (sharply) negative grant
elements in our EDA calculations.  Since disbursed amounts were substantial (on the order  of $26
'  Upon founding of the DRS in 1952, the system collected data only on public and publicly guaranteed debt.
In 1970, the system was expanded to cover private non-guaranteed debt.
12  Almost  all  developing  countries  are  members  of  the  World  Bank.  Current  membership,  including
developed countries, is 181.
13 See Appendix A for a complete listing of the countries included in our analysis.
14  However, it is important to note that  our  database lacks loan-by-loan information  on IMF flows. These
consist of standard INF loans, which are typically excluded from conventional aid aggregates, and highly-concessional
loans (such as SAF and ESAF), which are not. Further, the terms attached to the former loan category display
considerably  variation  over  time and across  loan  types,  while  those  on the latter  category  do not. This means  that an
approximate  calculation  of loan  grant elements  based  on average  (rather  than loan-specific)  IME  terms,  which  are
available,  should  be reasonably  accurate  for  the concessional-window  loans,  and  much  less  so  for  the non-concessional
ones.  In view of these  facts, we opted  for retaining  the concessional-window  EMF  flows  in our calculations,  and
discarding  the  non-concessional  window  loans.
15 In practice,  this choice  of starting  period  becomes  almost  unavoidable  given  the  very  limited  availability  of
interest  rate data  for non-dollar  currencies  prior to 1970  , which  would  prevent  construction  of appropriate  (liscount
rates  even  if complete  loan  data  were  available.10
billion), their inclusion would result in significant changes in 1995 EDA measures.  We chose not to
include Tequila loans in our coverage because this kind of financial rescue package is atypical in our
sample, both in its financial terms and its volume, and would distort the aid trends we analyze in this
paper.  16
Having defined our loan universe, an important step before embarking on the calculation of
grant elements is to verify the consistency of the DRS loan data with the CRS data underlying the
conventionally-used Net ODA.  This is important because we will later compare our EDA with the
OECD's Net  ODA, and we need to ensure that divergences between the two  aid measures are not
just due to discrepancies  between their respective data sources. To verify this, we used data from the
DRS to construct a DRS-based aid aggregate comparable to Net ODA. One problem in doing so is
the stated purpose of official loans: ODA includes only those concessional loans with a development-
related objective, while DRS includes all concessional loans regardless of their purpose.  To follow
the ODA definition, we  opted for removing from our DRS-based loan data those loans with the
clearest non-developmental purpose -- military and defense-related loans. 17
A second problem has to  do with the treatment of debt forgiveness. As noted earlier, the
OECD  accounts  for  debt  forgiveness by  recording  a  fictitious grant  matched  with  an  equally
fictitious loan repayment. In contrast, the DRS system does neither. Thus, to ensure comparability
between OECD ODA and DRS-based ODA, we  deducted debt forgiveness from the grant totals
when adding grant flows to DRS loan flows to construct our DRS-based ODA. 18
Figure 3.2 plots the nominal differences between DRS-based ODA constructed in this way
and conventional OECD ODA.  In general, the differences are quite  small. Mean  differences and
mean absolute differences between both  measures, computed for each recipient country over  the
period 1975-1995, cluster around zero for most countries.  The average across countries of the mean
differences is just $ 2.4 million.  By contrast, mean absolute differences are much larger -- their cross-
country average  is  $29  million. This  suggests timing mismatches between  creditor  and  debtor
reporting,  which cancel out  in the average  differences but  not  in the  mean absolute differences.
Indeed, mean absolute differences of three-year moving averages are substantially lower. Relative to
the recipient economy's size (in terms of GNP), the mean discrepancy is less than 1 percent of the
recipient's GNP for 125 of the 133 countries in the sample. The mean difference in the total sample
is -.07 percent of GNP, with a standard deviation of .77 percent.'9
16  However,  with the onset of financial  crises in emerging  markets  in 1997-98,  there appears  to be an
institutionalization  of this kind of lending  , both  in volume  (rescue  and emergency  lending  packages  will approach
$200  billion  in the period)  and in the hardness  of the terms. Future  revisions  of EDA  methodology  will  need  to
incorporate  these  new  developments  in some  way.
17 This  purpose  group  includes  some  350  loans.
"' Since  we are comparing  ODA  totals,  we adjusted  for ODA  debt  forgiveness  only, rather  than for all
forgiveness,  as defined  by the OECD.  The  main  difference  between  the two  is the forgiveness  of two large  non-ODA
loans  to Egypt  in 1991  and 1992.
19  We  also  examined  the  correlation  between  the OECD  and the DRS-based  ODA  measures.  The  correlation
was  computed  on  the loan  component  only,  since  both  measures  share  the same  grant  component.  On  a nominal  basis,
the sample  correlation  coefficient  is .89,  and  in three-year  moving  averages,  the  sample  correlation  coefficient  is .93.11
The  conclusion from  these  consistency  checks is  that  despite  the  differences in  lender
coverage and reporting methodology, the World Bank and the OECD's  databases are actually quite
similar for most countries in our sample.  Having comparable underlying loan data indicates that any
major divergences between  our  EDA  and  the  OECD's  Net  ODA  should be  driven mai:nly by
differences in methodology, which is precisely the focus of our subsequent analysis.
Interest Rate Data
The other key ingredient for the computation of the grant element is a set of appropriate rates
to discount the expected cash flow streams associated with each loan.  As discussed in the previous
section, the conventional approach underlying ODA uses an  arbitrary rate  of  10 percent  for  all
discounting, a practice that completely ignores market conditions and loan features relevant to the
opportunity costs that  discount rates ought  to  capture.  Proper  valuation should employ instead
discount rates that reflect the time, currency and maturity characteristics of the relevant cash flow.
Such rates therefore need to vary along all these dimensions.
To this end, we use as discount rates the market yields on government securities of various
maturities denominated in the six major lending currencies -- U.S. dollar, yen, deutsche mark, French
franc, British pound and Swiss franc.  Together (by themselves and as part of currency baskets) these
six currencies account for 88.8 percent of the total volume of loan disbursements in our loan sample.
We take the  market  yields on government  securities of  a  given maturity denomninated  in these
currencies  as  a measure  of the  risk-free rates  of  return  on  debt  of the  corresponding  mraturity
denorninated  in each respective currency.
From the 1980s on, the bulk of our interest rate data are collected from Bloomberg's bond
indexes. The indexes track the composite price and yield of a basket of government bonds considered
to  be  benchmark issues in  each currency.  For  each currency and  maturity, we  use the  annual
averages of all available monthly data. A major shortcoming of this  source, however, is the very
limited availability  of data prior to 1980 for all currencies other than the US dollar.  To complete the
time series, we resorted to other sources - mostly central bank bulletins and the  IMF's International
Financial Statistics. 20
With the raw annualized rates, we constructed yield curves for each of the six currencies and
each year of the period 1970-1995. Where yields are unavailable for a given maturity, we interpolate
across maturities using the observed rates for each year; hence, the interpolation derives thLe  term
structure  of interest rates implied by the observed benchmark rates. We experimented with both
linear and logarithmic interpolation. The latter involves fitting a log-linear curve across the observed
rates, while the former involves fitting piece-wise straight lines across the same observations.  Figure
3.3 plots the matrix of our interpolated rates for the US dollar.
20 Following  the IMF's practice,  where rates on T bills or other short term instruments  are not available,  3-
month  deposit  rates are used instead.  See Appendix  A for a complete  listing  of available  rates  and their sources.12
In the end, we opted for the logarithmically-interpolated  curves for several reasons.  First,
linear interpolation is problematic in cases where the rates at the long end of the yield curve are
missing. The reason is that the linear method would essentially  imply a flat term structure beyond the
last available short rate, or alternatively, dictate that the tail of the curve adopt the same slope of its
shorter  end  --  both  highly questionable assumptions.  The  logarithmic approach  offered more
flexibility  in dealing with this problem. Second, as will become clear later, we utilize the yield curves
to project future short-term interest rates, which serve as the basis of interest service on floating-rate
loans. Since these future short rates are derived from the slope of the yield curve, they take  on
extreme  values  from  abrupt  changes  in  slope  that  occur  around  observed  rates  on  linearly-
interpolated yield curves.
Lastly, to  discount the flows associated with loans denominated in multiple currencies, we
constructed yield curves for various currency baskets -- including the Special Drawing Rights (SDR),
European Currency Unit (ECU), and the lending baskets of major multilateral institutions (IBRD and
1DB). Currency weights  in  each  basket  are  applied  to  the  discount  rates  available in  our  six
currencies  to  build yield  curves  for  each basket. 22 Underlying weights  for  the  baskets  were
constructed from publicly-available sources.  In particular, the ECU, the SDR, the IiBRD and the
IDB baskets are collected from the respective institutions. 23
3.2 Computing Effective Development Assistance
Using the World Bank's DRS loan data and the currency-specific yield curves summarized
above, adjusted grant elements and grant equivalents were computed for all official (i.e., bilateral and
multilateral) non-military loans  in the  DRS  database  contracted  from  1970 onward.  The actual
calculations take  into  consideration the features of  each individual loan as  specified in the  loan
contract.  Thus, they  allow for  multi-year disbursement periods,  commitment fees  and  one-time
charges, various  amortization  profiles, variable interest  rates  and  so  on.  Formally, the  general
expression used to compute the grant element of a given loan is:
PV(D  "  P  A,  )V({C  }t  )]  (3.1)
g  PPV({D  }t=  0 )
21 However,  all the calculations  in the paper were performed  with both sets  of rates. The differences  between
the respective  results  were significant  for some  loans,  but negligible  for the broad aggregates  presented  below.
22 Historical  interest rate data were not available  for all underlying  currencies  in some  baskets.  In such cases,
we construct the full-basket  rates using ouly the available  currencies and rescaling  their weights to add up to 100
percent.
23 For loans denominated  in currencies  other than the major six (and the baskets just mentioned),  we adopt
the following  procedure. We construct generic baskets whose currency composition  reflects the general currency
profile of multilateral and bilateral loans.  We derive the basket weights each year from bilateral and multilateral
disbursements  made in each currency  in that year (scaled to exclude currencies  with unavailable  rates), and use the
weights  to aggregate  the discount  rates for each currency. The resulting  basket rates represent the weighted  average
opportunity  costs of bilateral and multilateral  lending made during  the year, and the associated  discount  rate is used
for loans denominated  in currencies  for which market  interest  rates are unavailable.13
where {D} is a sequence of disbursements, {A} is a sequence of principal amortization payments, {I}
is a sequence of interest payments, {C} is a sequence of other charges such as commitment fees, and
PV denotes the present value. The time indices 0, 6  y  and T respectively denote the date of first
disbursement, the number of periods between first and last disbursement, the grace period, and the
maturity of the loan. To keep the calculations manageable, annual periods were used; this obviously
represents an approximation in the (relatively frequent) case of loans specifying semi-annual service
payments. Notice that the term in square brackets in the numerator of (3.1) above is just the present
value of debt service obligations - i.e., the debt equivalent E introduced in the preceding section.
Present values of disbursement and service payment streams are computed using the discount
factors derived form the currency-specific yield curves just described. Hence, for any sequence {X},
T  T  xt
PV({X,}t 0)=O  (  )  (3.2)
where Ro,  is the (annualized) interest rate on t-year maturity instruments prevailing at time 0; it is
also currency-specific, an issue which for notational simplicity is ignored here. Hence, in accordance
with the ex-ante perspective adopted in this analysis,  the interest rates used for discounting are those
prevailing at the time of loan agreement, rather than those effectively observed ex-post 4
Some remarks on the  construction of the  disbursement and loan service streams mlay  be
useful. As with discount rates, the different components of loan service were constructed on the basis
of the  ex-ante  contractual  information --  and  not  from  the  interest  and  amortization payments
actually made ex-post by the borrower. Regarding the amortization schedule, the arrangement: most
frequently found in the data is that of equal repayments following a grace period. However, a wide
variety of amortization profiles exist in the data, ranging from annuity-based amortization schedules
to "balloon" principal repayments (whereby the loan is amortized in full in one single payment at
maturity).
In turn, interest charges are typically accrued at a contractually-determined rate on the loan's
outstanding balance. While a time-invariant interest rate is by far the most common arrangemernt,  in a
large number of cases the loan contract sets interest rates that change over the life of the loan, either
in a pre-specified manner or following a reference rate such as LIBOR. For the calculations, interest
charges were generally computed as
it  (  it<  )(D,-A)j  for O<t<  T  (3.3)
24 For simplicity,  in the text it is implicitly  assumed  that the dates of loan agreement  and first disbursement
are the same. While  this is indeed correct  for the majority  of loans, it is not invariably  the case -- the first disbursement
often takes place one or more  years after loan agreement.  The discount rates used in the calculations  in such cases
were those observed  at the time of agreement.  Experiments  were also made using instead the rates prevailing  at the
time of first disbursement.  This of course  affected the estimated grant elements  of specific  loans, but had a virtually
negligible  impact on the aggregate  annual grant equivalents  accruing  to each recipient  country.14
where it is the interest rate contractually specified for period t, and the term in large brackets is the
loan's outstanding principal as of the end of period t-1. The determination if it for the case of loans
with variable interest rates deserves comment. For those  loans with  interest rate linked to  some
short-term market rate (e.g., 6-month LIBOR), a forecast of the latter was constructed using the
anticipated one-period interest rate derived from the yield curve described earlier, adjusted for  a
margin calibrated from the historical data. Thus, the contractual interest rate was projected as:
t =  I  (I ~~~~+  Ro 0 t)t+1  34
it =bot +s  where  bo 0 =  1--(I  t  R  -',  j(1+Y)  (3 4)
where bo,  is the projected short-term market rate (e.g., LIBOR);  s is a contractual spread, and the
(proportional) margin ,u  was computed through a univariate regression of the short-term market rate
25 on the one-year rate from the yield curve.
A different type of variable interest-rate  arrangement concerns the loans granted by some
multilateral institutions since the early 1980s, whose interest rates are determined as a spread over
the lender's average (as opposed to marginal) cost of borrowing. This can be viewed as a weighted
sum of current and lagged interest rates on various currencies, and therefore follows market trends
with a substantial lag. Projection into the future of the cost of funds is further complicated by the fact
that the weights of the various currencies in the lender's borrowing basket can, and do, change over
time (albeit gradually). To  simplify the calculations, however, anticipated changes in the currency
composition of the borrowing basket were ruled out. Thus, the cost of funds relevant to each loan
was determined by aggregating the yield curves of the various currencies making up the lender's
borrowing  basket,  using  as  weights  their  shares in  the  basket  on  the  year  of  the  loan's  first
disbursement.
Finally, loans from major multilateral institutions typically carry commitment charges on the
undisbursed principal, that  accrue  periodically (commonly starting  60  days  after  commitment).
Hence, commnitment  fees were computed as:
Ct =  c  D,  - D,)  = c  ,Dt  ,  1<t<e5  (3.5)
Z-0  -r=O  -r=  t
The term in brackets captures the undisbursed loan amount as of the end of period t-1, and c is the
contractually-fixed  rate at which commitment fees accrue.
In  contrast with  service payments, the  contractual information usually does not  specify a
disbursement schedule. Thus, actual disbursements had to be used instead. This means that in our
discussion we use the term "loan principal" to refer to the total amount effectively disbursed, which
might differ from the contractually-agreed amount. Note  also that it is not  uncommon for actual
disbursements  to  lag  behind  the  originally  planned  schedule,  and  this  could  lead  to  an
25  As a robustness check, all calculations were repeated using an additive, rather than multiplicative, margin
pt.  The  impact  on the  estimated  grant  elements  was  negligible.15
underestimation of the grant element relative to its true ex-ante value (i.e., as viewed at the time of
agreement).26
Having obtained grant elements as just  described, the grant equivalent of each disbursement
is computed by imputing to the disbursement amount the loan's overall grant element:
Gt = g  g  D;  0 < t￿ '  (3.6)
It follows from (3.1) above that, in present value terms, PV({GJ)  = PV(DJ)  - [PV({Ad)  -+ PV(It})
+ PV({CtQ)]  . In words, the loan's overall grant equivalent (given by the discounted sum of the grant
equivalents of the different disbursements) equals the present value of the disbursement stream minus
the present value of the loan's debt service stream.
The  above  expressions are  quite  general  and  allow for  a  broad  variety  of  contractual
arrangements regarding amortization schedules, interest payments and other  charges. In  general,
however, they do not yield a closed-form expression for the grant element, which is only available
under additional assumptions. Specifically,  Appendix B shows that if (i) the loan is disbursecd  in full
at the time of commitment; (ii) the interest rate is fixed at i; (iii) the amortization profile involves
equal payments after a grace period y; (iv) the discount rate R is constant; and (v) commitment fees
and other charges are ignored, then (3.1) simplifies  to:
1  1
gz2  I  1+)  (3.7)
R1z)  R. (T-  Y  37
Conventional grant element calculations are based on (3.7) setting R equal to 10 percent.
In reality, of course, the assumptions just  listed do not hold,  and the "approximate" grant
element obtained from (3.7) could differ greatly from the correct one obtained from (3.1). As will be
shown below, however, in practice the main source of discrepancy turns out to be the assumption of
a constant discount rate; the other assumptions have a comparatively more modest impact on the
grant element calculation.
4  RE-ASSESSING  TRENDS IN AI)  FLOWS
The equations outlined in the preceding section were numerically evaluated for each one of a
total of over 40,000 loans 27 in the DRS database (of which some 24,000 were from bilateral lenders,
26  In addition,  comprehensive  disbursement  infonnation  is available  only in US dollars. This might introduce
another distortion in  the computed grant component of loans denomninated  in  other currencies: even if  their
disbursements  proceed  on schedule,  the time  profile  of disbursements  expressed  in dollars  could be altered ex-post due
to unanticipated  exchange  rate changes  during  the disbursement  period.16
and the rest from multilateral lenders). 28 All results are aggregated and summarized next, focusing
first on the broad aggregates and turning then to their breakdown by recipient and donor.
4.1  Measuring grant elements
The improved methodology just described has a major impact on the estimated aid content of
official loans. Figure 4.1 plots the average grant element of official loans as obtained from three
different approaches. First, the  conventional  (i.e., the OECD's)  approach,  using the  10-percent
discount rate  and imposing restrictive assumptions on the disbursement, interest and amortization
schedules (as needed to  arrive at the  simplified expression (3.7)  described earlier). Second, the
adjusted methodology proposed above, imposing no restrictions on loans'  disbursement, interest
and  amortization schedules, and  using the  year-,  currency- and  maturity-specific discount  rates
constructed in the previous section.  Third, for the purpose of comparison, the graph also presents an
intermediate approach allowing for unrestricted disbursement and service schedules but still using the
10-percent discount rate. In each case, the annual average of the grant elements of individual loans is
constructed using as weights the share of each loan in the year's total disbursements
The four panels of Figure  4.1 respectively show the average grant element of all official
loans, all multilateral loans, multilateral concessional-window loans, and bilateral loans. They bring
out three important facts. First, the conventional method leads to a systematic overestimation of the
average grant element, as shown by the fact that the adjusted grant element is almost invariably  lower
than the conventional one; the exception are the early 1980s in the case of bilateral and multilateral
concessional loans. Second, the gap between the grant element implied by the two approaches shows
substantial variation over time: it declined during the late  1970s, became almost negligible in the
early 1980s, and has widened dramatically since 1985. In fact, after that date the conventionally-
measured grant element has shown an upward trend, while the adjusted grant element has plunged --
particularly in the case of bilateral loans, whose concessionality fell to historical lows in the  1990s.
Third, the overestimation of the grant element by the conventional method appears to be due to its
assumption of a  10-percent discount rate. As the figures show, if all other restrictive assumptions
underlying the conventional method are removed, but the  10 percent discount rate is retained, the
resulting grant element is closer to the adjusted grant element, but the improvement is indeed rather
minimal.
The main lesson from these facts is that the use  of an arbitrary  10-percent discount rate
clearly distorts the conventionally-measured grant elements. In the sample, there is a positive bias
that varies considerably over time. A natural question is: how does this  arbitrary 10-percent rate
differ from the "right"  one? Conceptually, as argued above, the  discount rate should be not  only
time-varying, but  also  currency- and  maturity-specific --  precisely  the  approach  underlying the
calculations of the adjusted grant elements above. For the purpose  of illustration, however,  it is
possible to construct an ideal "average" discount rate, which is the one implied by the loan-by-loan
27 Of this total, some 50 loans had to be discarded  because  their contractual  information  regarding interest,
amortization  or both was incomplete  and did not allow calculation  of the corresponding  grant element.
28 For concessional  IMF  loans, the loan-by-loan  information  is not available,  as noted above.  Hence we used a
simplified  approach:  we plugged  into (3.7) the average terms of concessional  IMIF  disbursements  in each given  year,
using as disbursement  figure the corresponding  annual total, and allowing  the discount  rate to vary over  time.17
calculations of the adjusted grant elements. One simple way to  do this is to  solve the converntional
formula (3.7) for the discount rate that would yield the average adjusted grant element just presented
in the above graphs, for an ideal loan whose features (grace, maturity and interest rate) match those
of the average loan in the sample. Notice that, by doing this, all the other subtleties found in the
contractual  loan  information  (multi-year  disbursements,  time-varying  interest  rates,  irregular
amortization schedules, various loan charges...) are ignored.
Following this procedure for every sample year, a time-series of implicit discount rates can be
constructed. 29 The results are presented in Figure 4.2, which, for the purpose of illustratiorn,  also
plots the interest rate on  10-year U.S.  government  securities. The figure shows that the irnplicit
discount rate comes close to the horizontal 10-percent line only during the first half of the  1980s
(and the former even exceeds the latter in 1982). In the remaining years, the implicit rate is well
below the 10 percent benchmark, and especially so in the early 1970s and the 1990s. This, of course,
is just the underlying reason for the overstatement of the conventionally-measured grant elements in
those years, as described above. Finally, it is important to note that the time pattern of the irnplicit
discount rate is governed by the changing conditions in world financial markets. As the figure also
shows,  the  swings  of  the  former  track  those  in  U.S.  long-term  interest  rate,  although, with
considerably reduced magnitude -- reflecting the (increasing) role of non-dollar-denominated official
loans in overall lending flows.
4.2  Reassessing time trends in aid
So far the  discussion has  focused  on the  concessionality of  official loans.  What  are the
implications for measured aid flows? To  answer this question, the  first step is to  assess the aid
volume implicit in official  loans according to their adjusted grant elements; we shall refer to  such aid
volume as the effective development assistance of official loans. This can be constructed by summing
their adjusted grant equivalents, computed according to equation (3.6) above. The results are shown
in Figure 4.3, which also presents the grant equivalents derived from the conventional method as well
as those  arising from the intermediate method that uses the general expression (3.1) with  a  10-
percent  discount  rate.  To  facilitate  comparability across  years,  the  resulting totals  have  been
converted to 1995 U.S. dollars.
The graph again reveals a stark contrast between the conventional and adjusted figures after
1985: while the conventional grant equivalent has risen steadily to a record-high 20 billion by t]he  end
of the sample period, the adjusted grant equivalent has changed little over the last decade, and at
present amounts to some 8 billion. In other words, in recent years the conventional grant equaivalent
overestimates the aid content of official loans by 150 percent  !  Finally, like with the grant elements,
the  chart again confirms the relatively secondary role  of factors other than the  discount rate  in
explaining  the discrepancy between conventional and adjusted grant equivalents.
29 It is worth  noting  that the weights  used in each year to construct  the average loan features  (i.e., the average
grant element, grace, maturity and interest rate) for this calculation from those  of the individual loans are given by the
face value of each loan committed in the year  in question.  This follows logically from the use in the calculations of
equation (3.7), that assumes full loan disbursement at the time of comnmitment.  However, it differs from the weighting
scheme used in Figure 4.1 which, as noted in the text, is disbursement-based rather than commitment-based.18
Conventionally,  however,  the  aid  content  of  official  loans  is  measured  by  the  net
disbursement of  ODA loans.  Figure 4.4  compares such conventional measure with the  EDA of
official loans just described. 30 Unlike Net  ODA, EDA is based on gross flows, and hence it is not
surprising that the levels of the two measures should display persistent differences. However,  the
pattern is indeed very similar to those of the preceding figures: ODA overstates systematically  the aid
content  of official loans and, except for the early 1980s, the overstatement is quantitatively very
large. Moreover, because of the diverging pattern of both measures since 1985 -- rising Net ODA
loans and declining  EDA -- the former at present exceeds the latter by around 100 percent.
The above discussion has been confined to official loans. What is its relevance for total aid?
Adding official grants to the adjusted grant equivalent of official loans, one can construct a measure
of total EDA, analogous to ODA. Since grants have, by definition, a 100 percent grant equivalent,
any discrepancy between ODA and EDA is just due to their different measurement of the aid content
of official loans. As just  shown, such discrepancy is quite considerable; relative to  total  ODA or
EDA, however, it is somewhat lessened by the large (and increasing) magnitude of official grants
documented earlier. This is illustrated by Figure 4.5, which compares Net ODA and total EDA over
the last two decades. As with official loans, it is apparent that since 1985 Net  ODA considerably
overstates aid flows -- by as much as 25-30 percent in recent years.
4.3  EDA vs. ODA by recipient
Because EDA is based on a consistent measure of the concessionality of financial flows, it
allows meaningful comparisons of aid flows across donors and recipients. This is not the case with
comparisons of ODA flows, however, which can be misleading for a number of reasons: 1) because
of the potentially large differences in the grant/loan composition of flows from different donors or to
different recipients, 2) because  of the  potentially different degree of concessionality of the  loans
involved in those flows, or 3) because of differences in the time profile of lending flows impacting the
netting out of amortization in ODA calculations.
Indeed, there are systematic differences in the concessionality of official flows across both
recipients and donors. Figure 4.6 focuses on the recipient side, grouping aid-receiving countries into
six geographical regions, according to the World Bank's definition. The figure presents the average
grant element of official loans to each of the regions over the period 1990-95, computed according
to both the conventional method and the adjusted method introduced earlier.
As the figure shows, both methods reveal a considerable variation of grant elements across
regions.  Conventional grant elements range from  18 percent  in Europe  and  Central Asia to  49
percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. In turn, adjusted grant elements range from virtually zero in Europe
and Central Asia, as well as Latin America (for practical purposes, official  loans to these two regions
are not concessional), to  47 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly, the regional rankings by
grant element are similar under  both measures. However, the extent  of divergence between them
varies considerably across regions -- from just over 2 percentage points in Sub-Saharan Africa, to 12
in South Asia and some 20 percentage points in the other developing regions.
30 As noted  earlier,  the  loan  database  used  here  does  not allow  construction  of a satisfactory  DRS-based  ODA
measure  prior  to 1975,  and  hence  the chart  begins  in that  year.19
How  do these diverging assessments of loan concessionality across recipient regions impact
on measured regional aid flows? Figure 4.7 presents the ratio of Net  ODA to  total EDA in recent
years for each of the six developing regions above; the underlying flows are expressed in 1995 US
dollars. The figure illustrates eloquently how the degree of distortion embodied in conventional aid
measures can vary across aid recipients. For East Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the
Caribbean, the contrast between both Net  ODA and total EDA is dramatic: during 1990-95, Net
ODA to these two regions exceeded effective assistance by around 60 percent. At the other end, for
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (who receive mostly grants), the divergence is much smaller -
around 10 percent in both cases.
4.4  EDA vs. ODA by donor
Like with recipients, EDA also permits consistent comparisons of aid flows across donors.
By way of example, we conclude this section with a brief look at the comparative performance of
bilateral donors.
Conceptually, it  should be  clear  from the  earlier discussion that,  since conventional aid
measures typically overstate the grant elements of concessional loans, such measures will tend to
exaggerate the contribution of donors whose disbursements take the form mostly of loans. Further,
the overstatement will be more severe for donors lending in low-yield currencies, because the interest
rate on their loans will tend to be below the arbitrary 10 percent discount rate used in conventional
grant  element  calculations.  The  opposite  will  happen  with  donors  giving  mostly  grants,  or
concessional loans  in high-yield currencies - conventional measures will tend to  overstate  their
contribution to a more limited extent.
Figure 4.8 ranks DAC donors according to their respective volume of aid relative to  GNP,
using both Net  ODA and EDA, for the periods 1981-85, 1986-90 and 1991-95. Two qualifications
are in order. First, the figures underlying the rankings only include donors'  direct aid to developing
countries and therefore exclude their contributions to  multilateral institutions. Second, because we
lack detailed debt forgiveness data by donor prior to 1991, the figures for 1989 and 1990 underlying
the rankings are not adjusted for ODA debt forgiveness - i.e., donors' grant totals (and hence total
aid) in those years mnight  include forgiveness of ODA debt. 3"
With these caveats, the figure reveals interesting contrasts between the ODA and EDA--based
donor rankings. Most remarkable is the fact that a few donors -- notably Japan, but also France and
Spain (the latter after 1981-1985) -- rank systematically higher under ODA than under EDA. This
likely reflects the high reliance of these donors on loans rather than grants and, at least in the case of
Japan, also the fact that  yen interest rates have remained well below the  10 percent benchunark.
Correspondingly, other donors find themselves in the opposite situation, ranking higher under EDA
than ODA. This is the case of Canada (especially in 1986-90) and, more recently, the Netherlands as
well.
31 Prior to 1989 ODA debt forgiveness is negligible.20
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Conventional aid aggregates such as the OECD's  Net ODA provide a distorted measure of
true  aid flows.  The reason  for  this  distortion  is the  weak  methodological foundation  of  such
aggregates. They lump together the net increase in loans, which entail future interest and repayment
obligations, with grants, that do not; further, they include certain loans at full face value and totally
exclude others; finally, the selection of which loans to include is based on a calculation of their grant
elements that, among other simplifications,  makes use of an arbitrary discount rate set at 10 percent.
This paper has proposed a new approach that corrects most  of the major methodological
shortcomings underlying conventional aid measures. The approach is based on the use of the overall
grant equivalent of official disbursements as the key measure of aid, resulting in a new aggregate that
we label Effective Development Assistance (EDA). The use of grant equivalents as the basic aid
measure has the virtue of allowing comparability  between aid flows implicit in grants as well as loans
with  varying  degrees  of  concessionality. Most  importantly,  EDA  is  based  on  adjusted  grant
equivalents constructed using discount rates sensitive to market conditions along several dimensions
- timing, currency and maturity of the loans --, unlike the conventional grant elements based on the
arbitrary 10 percent discount rate.
The paper  has implemented empirically this new  approach  using  detailed data  on  some
40,000 official loans from the World Bank's DRS database -- virtually all the official loans during the
period 1975-1995 to thel33  developing countries included in the DRS system. The numerical results,
which  are available to  all interested  researchers, underscore  several important  facts.  First,  the
conventional approach to  grant element calculation has led to  a systematic overestimation of the
concessionality of official loans. Second, this overestimation has increased significantly  since the mid-
1980s. After that date, conventionally-computed grant elements have shown a rising trend, while the
conceptually superior adjusted grant elements show, if anything, the  opposite time pattern.  Grant
equivalents obtained by both methods reveal the same contrasting pattern. Third, as a consequence
of these results, Net  ODA increasingly overstates the true  aid content  of  official flows, as more
accurately measured by EDA - even though the large divergence between both approaches in their
assessment of the aid content of official loans is somewhat muted by the rising importance of grants
over loans in total official flows.
Since conventional aid measures typically overstate the grant elements of concessional loans,
they tend to  exaggerate comparatively more the aid flows to those recipients getting mostly loans.
This is so especially if the loans are given in low-yield currencies, because their interest rate will tend
to  be  further below  the  arbitrary  10 percent  discount rate  used  in  conventional grant  element
calculations. The same happens with donors: the aid contribution of those giving mostly grants (and
loans  in  high-yield currencies)  will be  understated  relative  to  the  others.  The  paper  presents
numerical findings  confirming these  intuitive  facts.  This  in  turn  implies that  conventional  aid
measures can be very misleading  for purposes of comparison across recipients and/or donors.
While we believe that these results are highly relevant to the current policy debate on aid,
some caveats remain. First, our approach to the measurement of aid adopts an ex-ante perspective in
order  to  capture  donors'  effort,  and it would  be  interesting to  compare  our  results with  those21
obtained from an ex-post  approach - based on actual rather than contractual  debt service flows.
Second, and perhaps more important, while our analysis addresses most of the key limitations of
conventional aid measures,  it  still does  not  incorporate  default  risk  in the  calculations of  loan
concessionality. Doing so would basically require construction of the risk spreads applicable to each
borrower each year for each creditor class. However, in the absence of markets for official debt to
price directly such risks, this would be a rather problematic task, well beyond the scope of this paper.22
Appendix A
This appendix  lists the countries  included  in our analysis  and the sources  of our raw discount  rate data.
I.  INCLUDED RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
Recipient  countries  included  in our analysis  are listed  by region  in the box below:
East Asia  and Pacific  Europe  and Central  Latin  America  and  Middle  East and  Sub-Saharan  Africa
Asia  the Caribbean  North Africa
Cambodia  Albania  Argentina  Algeria  Angola
China  Armenia  Barbados  Egypt  Benin
Fiji  Azerbaijan  Belize  Iran  Botswana
Indonesia  Belarus  Bolivia  Jordan  Burkina Faso
Korea  Bulgaria  Brazil  Lebanon  Burundi
Laos  Czech Republic  Chile  Malta  Cameroon
Malaysia  Estonia  Colombia  Morocco  Cape Verde
Mongolia  Georgia  Costa Rica  Oman  Central African Republic
Myanmar  Hungary  Dominica  Syrian Arab Republic  Chad
Papua New Guinea  Kazakhstan  Dominican Republic  Tunisia  Comoroas
Philippines  Kyrgyz Republic  Ecuador  Yemen, Republic of  Congo
Solomon Islands  Latvia  El Salvador  Cote d'lvoire
Thailand  Lithuania  Grenada  Djibouti
Tonga  Moldova  Guatemala  South Asia  Equatorial Guinea
Vanuatu  Poland  Guyana  Eritrea
Viet Nam  Romania  Haiti  Bangladesh  Ethiopia
Western Samoa  Russian Federation  Honduras  Bhutan  Gabon
Slovak  Republic  Jamaica  India  Gambia, The
Tajikistan  Mexico  Maldives  Ghana
Turkey  Nicaragua  Nepal  Guinea
Turkmenistan  Panama  Pakistan  Guinea-Bissau
Ukraine  Paraguay  Sri Lanka  Kenya
Uzbekistan  Peru  Lesotho
St. Kitts and Nevis  Liberia
St. Lucia  Madagascar
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  Malawi

















Total Included: 133  Congo, Dem. Rep (Zaire)
Zambia
Zimbabwe23
II.  SOURCES OF DISCOUNT RATE DATA 3 2
Bloomberg:  The bulk of our data after the mid-80s is collected from Bloomberg.  Bloomberg maintains
indexes on benchmark treasuries in all six major lending currencies.  These Bloomberg "generic" treasury
indexes track the composite price and yield of a basket of bonds considered to be benchmark issues in each
market.  Price of a "generic" bond, note or bill of a specified maturity is an average of a number of market
maker bid-side quotes updated hourly,  several times throughout the day,  or at  closing, depending on the
market.
For consistency, all monthly data available in Blooomberg are collected and used.  Annual rates are
calculated by taking simple arithmetic averages of monthly yields.  The resulting data is comprehensive for the
90s for all currencies.  A major shortcoming of these Bloomberg rates  is the lack of historical data for all
currencies except the US dollar.  To complete the series, we collected data from other sources - mostly central
bank bulletins and the IMF's  International Financial Statistics.
Listed below are sources from which we collected historical yields and interest rates.  Following the
IMF's practice, where rates on T bills or other short term instruments are not available, 3 month deposit rates
are used instead.  Note that yields on Bloomberg generic government bills, notes or bonds are simply referred
to as "Bloomberg."
US RATES
3 month  T bills  IM1, International  Financial Statistics,  discount on new issues of three month T bills,
annual data are averaged  weekly  rates.
6 month T bills  1983-1996:  Bloomberg,  generic  6 month T bills.
2 year treasury  1977-1996:Bloomberg.
3 year  treasury  1970-1996:  Bloomberg.
5 year treasury  1970-1996:  Bloomberg.
10  year treasury  1970-1996:  Bloomberg.
30 year treasury  1970-1979:  Ibbotson  Associates.
1980-1996:  Bloomberg.
UK RATES
3 month  T bills  1970-1996:  IMF, International Financial Statistics (as reported by Bank of England,
Quarterly Bulletin).  Rates represent tender rates at  which 91 day T bills are issued,
calculated  from amount of discount. Monthly  data are weighted  averages  of Friday clata.
Annual figures  are averaged  monthly  rates.
2 year UK Gilt  1992-1996:  Bloomberg.
3 year UK Gilt  1992-1996:Bloomberg.
4 year UK Gilt  1992-1996:Bloomberg  generic  4 year.
5 year  UK Gilt  1970 to 1991: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Great
Britain.  Rates are par (gross redemption)  yields calculated  from yield-maturity  curves
fitted mathematically.  Until 1979, annual rates are averages  of Wednesday  yields. From
1980  on, the averages  are of all observations  (usually  3 per week);  and from 1982  forward,
the figures are averages  of working days.  See Bank of England Quarterly  Bulletini for
descriptions  of actual methods  of calculation. Note  that all CSO rates are calculated  in the
same  fashion  for the various maturities.
1992  to 1996: Bloomberg.
32 Discount  rate data is available  upon request.24
7 year UK Gilt  1992-1996:Bloomberg.
10 year UK Gilt  1970 to 1991:  Annual Abstract of Statistics, Central Statistical Office of Gieat Britain.
1992 to 1996: Bloomberg.
15 year UK Gilt  1994-1995: Bloomberg.
20 year UK Gilt  1970 to 1991: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Central Statistical Office of Great Britain.
1992 to 1996: Bloomberg generic 20 year.
30 year UK Gilt  1996: Bloomberg.
JAPANESE  RATES
3 month deposit rate  IMF, International Financial  Statistics. From June 1992, rates are average interest rate for
the last week of the month on unregulated three-month time deposits.  Prior to that, rates
are end of month guideline rates on three month time-deposits set by the Bank of Japan.
Annual rates are averaged monthly rates.
1 year  1995-1996: Bloomberg.
2 year  1979 to  1989: Economic Statistics Monthly, Research and  Statistics Department, Bank of
Japan (BOJ).  Rates are yields to subscribers of interest-bearing govermment  bonds of the
specified  maturities.  Data  is  available  for  monthly  frequency.  Annual  figures  are
averaged monthly rates.
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.
3 year  1978 to 1988: Economic Statistics Monthly, BOJ.
1989 to 1996: Bloomberg.
4 year  1980 to 1987: Economic Statistics Monthly, BOJ.
1988 to 1996: Bloomberg.
5 year  1988-1996: Bloomberg.
6 year  1994 to 1995: Economic Statistics Monthly, BOJ.
1996: Bloomberg.
7 year  1970 to 1986: Economic Statistics Monthly, BOJ.
1987 to 1996: Bloomberg.
10 year  1970 to 1986: IMF, G7 database.  Data collected on a  monthly basis.  Before (Nov. '84)
end-of-month; thereafter,  average  of  over-the-counter  10-year govermnent  bonds,  with
longest residual maturity; from  January 6,  1992, the  yield  refers to benchmark  10-year
government bond.  Annual figures are averaged monthly rates.
1987 to 1996: Bloomberg.
15 year  1992-1996: Bloomberg.
20 year  1986 to 1991: Economic Statistics Monthly, BOJ.
1992 to 1996: Bloomberg.
GERMAN RATES
3 month deposit rate  1970-1996:  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS).  Monthly  rate  represent
arithmetic average of daily quotations reported by Banks for three month interbank deposit
rates.
1 year T bill  1975-1996: IMF, IFS, rate on 12 month Federal debt register claims.
2 year  1977 to 1989: Statistische Beihefte  ze  den Monatsberichten  der Deutschen  Bundesbank,
or  Kapitalmarkt-statistik after 1990, Deutsche Bundesbank (Statistical Supplements to the
Monthly  Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank,  or Capital Market  Statistics  after  1990).
Rates are yields on fully taxed public bonds outstanding with remaining maturity of over
one up  to two years.  Annual  rates are averaged monthly  rates.  Rates from  this  source
reported below are referred to as Deutsche Bundesbank.
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.
3 year  1977 to 1989: Deutsche Bundesbank, remaining maturity of over 2 up to 3 years.
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.25
4 year  1977 to 1989: Deutsche Bundesbank  remaining maturity of over 3 up to 4 years.
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.
5 year  1977 to 1989: Deutsche Bundesbank  remaining maturity of over 4 up to 5 years.
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.
6 year  1977 to 1992: Deutsche Bundesbank  remaining maturity of over 5 up to 6 years.
1993 to 1996: Bloomberg.
7 year  1977 to 1989: Deutsche Bundesbank, remaining maturity of over 6 up to 7 years.
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.
8 year  1977 to 1992: Deutsche Bundesbank, remaining maturity of over 7 up to 8 years.
1993 to 1996: Bloomberg.
9 year  1977 to 1992: Deutsche Bundesbank  remaining maturity of over 8 up to 9 years.
1993 to 1996: Bloomberg.
10 year  1970 to  1989: IiMF, G7 Database.  Yield  on government bonds with  maturities  of  9-10
years.
30 year  1994-1996: Bloomberg.
FRENCH  RATES
3 month T bill  1970-1996: IMF, IFS, 3 month T bill rate.
2 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
3 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
4 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
5 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
7 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
10 year  1970 to  1989: IMF,  G7  Database.  Rates  are  long-term  (7-10  yr.)  govt.  bond  yields
(Emprunts d'Etat a long terme TME).
1990 to 1996: Bloomberg.
20 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
30 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.
SWISS RATES
3 month deposit rate  1973-1996: Swiss National  Bank  Monthly  Bulletin  (Banque  Nationale  Suisse, Bulletin
Mensuel).  3 month deposit rates offered by large banks.  Up to June  1989, monthly rates
represent averaged daily values.  From July 1989, monthly rates are end of month rates.
Annual rates are averaged monthly rates.
2 year  1994-1995: Bloomberg
3 year  1994-1996: Bloomberg
5 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg
7 year  1970  to  1984:  JvIF,  IFS,  weighted  average  yield  to  maturity  (if  below  par)  of  ten
government  bonds  with  at  least  five years  to  maturity,  callable.  Annual  yields  are
computed from daily averages of prices.
1985 to 1993: Swiss National Bank Monthly Bulletin,  Federal government obligations of
more than 7 years maturity.
1994 to 1996: Bloomberg.
9 year  1996: Bloomberg.
10 year  1990-1996: Bloomberg.26
Appendix B
This appendix shows how the methodological approach used in the paper to  compute the
adjusted grant elements contains as a special case the conventionally-used grant element formula.
The starting point is provided by equations (3.1)-(3.3) in the text, to which the following
simplifying  assumptions are added:
Assumption 1: The loan is disbursed in full at the time of commitment
Assumption 2: The principal is repaid in T-y equal amortization payments, starting in year y+l  and
ending in year T (where T > 7 2 0)
Assumption 3: The interest rate is fixed at i throughout the life of the loan
Assumption 4: The discount rate is fixed at R
Assumption 5: The loan involves no charges other than interest and amortization
The first assumption implies that the present value of the disbursement stream is just PV(PtD)  =
Do, where t=O is the date of commitment. In turn, Assumption 2 implies that amortization payments
are of the form
- D=  (T  ° )fory<t<T  (A.1)
(T -y)
and zero otherwise. Hence, using Assumption 4, the present value of the amortization stream equals:
PV({A~  })  [T~Yr] tL+, (1+R) t
- T-r  [R  (I+  R)r  (1 +R)TI  (A.2)
Using (A.  1) and Assumption 3, the sequence of interest charges can be constructed as follows.
First, the loan's  outstanding principal, equal to  the  cumulative sum of  disbursements minus the
cumulative sum of amortization payments, is given by:
Do  forO<t<y;
Do- (t-Y)T  l  fory<t<T  (A.3)
and interest charges therefore follow the path
I,  =  i*Do  forO<t<y+1
=i  D  T-t+1]  fory+l<t<T  (A.4)
Thus, the present value of the stream of interest payments is:27
_____  i.Do.T-t+lI
PV[{1 1}]  E  (l1±R)  + R)'  t=2  (1 + R)t (A.)
where the two  summation signs refer to  the interest charges incurred during and after the grace
period respectively (the second  sum only applies if  T - r  >  1, i.e., whenever the loan is not
amortized in full in a single payment). Tedious manipulations permit simplifying  this expression to:
PVR  - i* 0ri+  (A.  6)
R  T-r  R(I+R)  (I+R)y
Replacing (A.2) and (A.6) into the grant element equation (3.1) in the text,
rDo I  I  Do  I  I  I  1)X
Do-  TI- r  R  (1±+1R)r  (1  +R)T  R  T-y  R  (1+R)T  (1+RY]]]
Do
This can be easily simplified  to:
(1-  R1+Y)  (l + R)T
g  (I  R  R-(T-yr)
which is equation (3.7) in the text. This simplified expression allows some useful insights. First, the
sign of the grant element depends only on the relation between the interest rate and the discount rate.
In particular, if the discount rate equals the interest rate, then the grant element is zero regardless of
loan grace and maturity (notice, however, that this would not be the case if the loan entailed any
service fees in addition to interest charges). Second, the lower the interest rate i for a given discount
rate R,  the larger the grant element.  Third, for a given configuration of interest and discount-  rates,
the absolute value of the grant element rises with the grace  and maturity periods, and reaches a
maximum (equal to  1 - i/R) when both grace and maturity approach infinity -- i.e., in the case of a
consol.28
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Note:  DRS-based  ODA  is official  development  assistance  constructed  with loan-by-loan  data  from  the  World  BanKs  Debtor  Reporting  System.Figure 3.3 US Dollar Yield Curves
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Note:  Excluding  TA  and  debt  forgiveness.FIGURE 4.8  Ranking of Bilateral Aid by Donor: ODA/GNP vs EDA/GNP
1981-85  1986-90  1991-965
RANK  ODA/GNP  EDAIGNP  ODAIGNP  EDAIGNP  ODAIGNP  EDAIGNP
1  NORWAY  0.366%  NORWAY  0.366%  NORWAY  0.417%  NORWAY  0.415%  NORWAY  0.386%  NORWAY  0.382%
2  NETHERLANDS  0.351%  SWEDEN  0.347%  SWEDEN  0.378%  DENMARK  0.351%  SWEDEN  0.318%  DENMARK  0.327%
3  SWEDEN  0.349%  NETHERLANDS 0.313%  DENMARK  0.364%  SWEDEN  0.338%  DENMARK  0.315%  SWEDEN  0.314%
4  AUSTRALIA  0.238%  AUSTRALIA  0.240%  NETHERLANDS  0.312%  NETHERLANDS  0.295%  FRANCE  0.244%  FINLAND  0.220%
5  DENMARK  0.221%  DENMARK  0.217%  FINLAND  0.208%  CANADA  0.209%  FINLAND  0.235%  NETHERLANDS 0.218%
6  CANADA  0.184%  CANADA  0.190%  CANADA  0.207%  FINLAND  0.196%  AUSTRIA  0.214%  FRANCE  0.195%
7  JAPAN  0.175%  BELGIUM  0.151%  JAPAN  0.200%  AUSTRALIA  0.169%  NETHERLANDS  0.190%  AUSTRIA  0.190%
8  BELGIUM  0.158%  UK  0.123%  AUSTRALIA  0.182%  SWITZERLAND  0.130%  AUSTRALIA  0.180%  AUSTRALIA  0.157%
9  FRANCE  0.136%  JAPAN  0.121%  FRANCE  0.164%  ITALY  0.123%  JAPAN  0.160%  SWITZERLAND  0.148%
10  UK  0.115%  FRANCE  0.112%  ITALY  0.145%  FRANCE  0.104%  SWITZERLAND  0.152%  GERMANY  0.141%
11  SWITZERLAND 0.113%  SWITZERLAND  0.109%  SWITZERLAND  0.135%  BELGIUM  0.102%  GERMANY  0.146%  CANADA  0.127%
12  UK  0.115%  GERMANY  0.092%  GERMANY  0.114%  JAPAN  0.100%  CANADA  0.133%  BELGIUM  0.121%
13  USA  0.086%  USA  0.081%  BELGIUM  0.104%  GERMANY  0.097%  BELGIUM  0.117%  LUXEMBOURG  0.117%
14  FINLAND  0.082%  FINLAND  0.080%  UK  0.077%  UK  0.084%  LUXEMBOURG  0.117%  JAPAN  0.084%
15  ITALY  0.061%  AUSTRIA  0.052%  USA  0.060%  USA  0.061%  ITALY  0.104%  ITALY  0.084%
16  NEW  ZEALAND  0.043%  NEW  ZEALAND  0.051%  PORTUGAL  0.051%  PORTUGAL  0.048%  SPAIN  0.089%  UK  0.074%
17  AUSTRIA  0.041%  ITALY  0.050%  SPAIN  0.040%  NEW  ZEALAND  0.036%  UK  0.068%  USA  0.067%
18  SPAIN  0.028%  SPAIN  0.029%  AUSTRIA  0.040%  AUSTRIA  0.035%  USA  0.065%  SPAIN  0.048%
19  IRELAND  0.020%  IRELAND  0.020%  NEW  ZEALAND  0.036%  SPAIN  0.022%  PORTUGAL  0.042%  PORTUGAL  0.039%
20  PORTUGAL  0.002%  PORTUGAL  0.011%  LUXEMBOURG  0.019%  LUXEMBOURG  0.019%  NEW  ZEALAND  0.039%  NEW  ZEALAND  0.039%
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